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CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, 
AND THE SEPARATION 
OF POWERS: 
R.ErrHINKING THE VALUE 
OF LITIGATION 
Jonathan L. Entin* 
T he term "separation of powers" appears nowhere in the Constitution. Nevertheless, the division of federal authority among three distinct but 
interdependent branches is one of the defining features of the American 
governmental system. Designed to promote both liberty and efficiency, this 
structure affords ample opportunity for interbranch conflict. Consistent with 
Tocqueville's famous observation that "[s]carcely any political question arises 
in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial 
guestion," 1 the Supreme Court recently has addressed an unusually large 
number of disputes concerning the respective powers of Congress and the 
President. 2 This has occurred even though the New Deal apparently had 
transformed the seemingly arcane subject of separation of powers into a 
topic of primarily antiquarian interest. 3 
The renewed attention to the problem of government structure was largely 
stimulated by three cases that arose from the Watergate affair. The first, 
Copyright© 1990 by Jonathan L. Entin. 
*Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. This is a revised and 
abridged version of a longer article, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits 
of judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1990). 
1 ] A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (P. Bradley ed. 1945). 
2The relationship between Congress and the President has not been the only aspect of 
government structure that has occupied the Court's attention during this period. Two other 
problems also have generated significant litigation. The first relates to the constitutionality 
of assigning the power to adjudicate legal claims to tribunals whose members lack the tenure 
and salary protections enjoyed by article III judges. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Northern Pipeline Constr. 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Another line of cases adqresses the 
problem of federalism and the role of the states in our constitutional system. E.g., National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
'See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, l 01 HARV. L. REV. 421, 437-52 (1987). 
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United States v. Nixon;' upheld the validity of a subpoena for tape recordings 
of presidential conversations relating to the illegal entry into the headquar-
ters of the Democratic National Committee, a ruling that led ineluctably to 
Mr. Nixon's resignation from office two weeks later. The next case, Buckley 
v. ll aleo, 5 held unconstitutional the process for selecting members of the 
Federal Election Commission, an agency created as part of the statutory 
reforms passed in the wake of perceived fund-raising abuses in President 
Nixon's 1972 reelection campaign. The third, Nixon v. Administrator of Gen-
eral SeYvices, 6 rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute de-
priving Mr. Nixon of control over his presidential papers. 
Increasing1y frequent separation of pov.rers litigation has not been simply 
an artifact of Watergate, however. 1nterbranch conflicts occupied a central 
place on the Court's docket during the 1 980s. Among the more notable 
cases were INS v. Chadha,; which invalidated the legislative veto; Bowsher l'. 
Synar, 8 which struck down the central feature of the original Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings Act; and Mon-ison v. Olson, 9 which upheld the independent 
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. 10 
This line of cases has left us in an unsatisfactory position. The Court has 
failed to articulate a consistent methodology for analyzing separation of 
powers disputes involving Lhe legislative and executive branches. Sometimes 
it follows a formal approach analogous to the " 'strict' in theory and fatal 
'418 u.s. 583 (1974). 
'424 U.S. ] (1975) (per curiam). 
''433 u.s. 425 (1977). 
'452 U.S. 919 (1983); accord Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 591 F.2d 575 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982) (en bane) (per curiam), ajfd mem. sub nom. United States Senate v. FTC, 453 U.S. 
1215 (1983); Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 573 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), 
ajfd mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 453 
u.s. 1215 (1983). 
8478 u.s. 714 (1985). 
9487 u.s. 554 (1 988). 
'"The Court also decided some less publicized separation of powers cases during this 
period. See, e.g., Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline, 490 U.S. 212 (1989) (upholding user fees 
imposed upon pipeline operators by Secretary of Transportation); Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 351 (1989) (upholding validity of sentencing guidelines promulgated by United 
States Sentencing Commission). 
These decisions represent only .the. tip ?f the iceberg. J~u.mero;:s Jo;:;~ cou;:t ca.ses ~so 
addresserl challenges to the constnuuonahty of federa] acuvJites. r...g.J .JJ:.\..._, v. nhnaer, I"<o-
binson & Co., 855 F.2d 577, 581-82 (lOth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989); 
Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Ameron, Inc. v. United States 
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 881-87 (3d Cir. 1985), on reh'g, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 
1985), cal. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 
597 F.2d 303,305-05 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Friedlander v. United States Postal Serv., 
558 F. Supp. 95, 99-102 (D.D.C. 1987). A rough statistical survey recently found a marked 
increase in the number of federal cases since 1950 in which the court discussed the concept 
of separation of powers, an increase that persisted even with modest controls for growth in 
the size and output of the judiciary. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation: Sepamtion of 
Powers in the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 40 l. 402-04 ( 1 989). 
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in fact" scrutiny in equal protection cases. 11 On other occasions the Court 
uses a more functional approach focusing upon checks and balances. During 
the 1980s, the selection of the analytical method determined the outcome 
of every legislative-executive controversy. The inconsistencies in outcomes 
and methodology are hardly unique to separation of powers problems, 12 but 
they suggest the need for greater analytical clarity than the Court thus far 
has demonstrated. 
At a more fundamental level, the quest for ultimate judicial resolution of 
constitutional turf battles between Congress and the President has undesir-
able consequences for the nation as a whole. Separation of powers disputes 
implicate fundamental questions respecting the role of government, ques-
tions that rarely receive detailed attention in Supreme Court opinions. Ex-
cessive reliance upon the Court deceives us into thinking that these disputes 
are purely constitutional in nature and that only the Justices can resolve 
them. Demanding judicial resolution improperly diminishes the role of the 
political branches in interpreting the Constitution; emphasizing the consti-
tutionality of a proposal diverts attention from its often dubious wisdom. 
The limited utility of judicial review in legislative-executive conflicts has 
been demonstrated numerous times. For example, the courts played no role 
in the controversy over the Tenure of Office Act, 13 probably the most severe 
separation of powers problem in our history. Indeed, congressional con-
cerns about the constitutionality of that statute contributed to the acquittal 
of Andrew Johnson in the only presidential impeachment trial ever con-
ducted by the Senate. 14 The Act was amended in 1869 during the first weeks 
ofthe Grant administration and repealed, after perfunctory debate, in 1887 
by a Congress which recognized the unfortunate experiment as the great 
national embarrassment that it was. 15 
Similarly, the judiciary has served as a bystander throughout the contro-
versy over the War Powers Resolution. 15 Congress passed that measure in 
1973 to prevent a repetition of what was widely regarded as the unilateral 
''Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Fore-.vord: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I, 8 (1972). 
12 A notable illustration in a more contentious area involves the display of religious symbols 
on public property. Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (allowing creche with 
secular decorations) with County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (disallowing 
unadorned creche but permitting menorah). 
"Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867),amended by Act of Apr. 5,1869, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6, repealed 
by Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500. The Supreme Court retroactively condemned 
the Act as unconstitutional approximately forty years after its repeal. Myers v. United States, 
272 u.s. 52, 176 (1926). 
14The votes of seven Republican senators, otherwise opponents of the President, were 
essential to Johnson's acquittal. These senators voted to acquit at least in part out of concern 
that the Tenure of Office Act violated the Constitution. E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 336 
(1988); H. TREFOUSSE, ANDREW jOHNSON 330-31 (1989). 
"See Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, and Administrative 
Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 722-23 (1987). 
'"50 u.s.c. §§ 1541-1548 (1988). 
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executive commitment of American military forces to the war in Southeast 
Asia. 17 No President has accepted its validity, although several have sub-
mined reports to Congress in apparent compliance with its terms. 18 At the 
same time, the legislative branch has scrupulously avoided invocation of the 
Resolution in every situation in which it seemed to apply, including the 
Persian Gulf conflict. 19 Court rulings have neither undermined this measure 
nor stimulated recent proposals to amend it. 20 
Finally, Watergate itself suggests the limits of judicial review in separation 
of pov~,rers disputes betv..reen the po1itical branches. P..Jthough the Supreme 
Court decision in the tapes case led directly to President Nixon's resigna-
tion; the judicial pronouncement \Vas not the only factor in his departure 
from office. The House judiciary Committee was conducting a simultaneous 
inquiry that culminated in the voting of three articles of impeachment against 
the President. While members of Congress might have preferred to await 
the Court's ruling, the impeachment process by itself probably would have 
led to the same denouement. 21 
The emphasis upon the limited utility of judicial resolution of separation 
of powers disputes between the political branches is addressed primarily to 
elected officials, lawyers, and citizens. 1t suggests that less reliance upon 
litigation could promote more intelligent public policymaking by creating 
opportunities for reasonable accommodation of conflicting viewpoints. Fol-
lowing the course recommended in this article would not be a panacea. This 
approach involves the creation of necessary, not sufficient, conditions for 
more effective governance and politics. 
At the same time, the discussion has implications for courts called upon 
to resolve interbranch separation of powers disputes. Some commentators, 
most notably Dean Choper, have suggested that the judiciary refrain from 
"ln fact, Congress approved presidential action in the region when it passed the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution in August, 1964. H.R.J. REs. 1145, 78 Stat. 384 (1964), repealed by Act of 
Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055. Thereafter the executive 
branch asserted that the Resolution served as the functional eguivalent of a congressional 
declaration of war. See, e.g., Department of State, Office of the Legal-Adviser, The Legality 
of United Stales Participation in the Defense of VietNam, 75 YALE LJ. I 085, ll 02-06 (1966). 
'"Sec HOUSE Coi,·lili. ON FOREIGN AFFAlRS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE -WAR POWERS 
RESOLUTION 169-254 (Comm. Print !982) [hereinafter HOUSE STUDY]; Carter, The Consti-
tutionality of the War Powe-rs Resolution, 70 VA. L REV. I 0 l, I 04-07 (1984); Koh, Why the 
President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE LJ 
1255, 1260 & nn.l4-15 (1988); Comment, The War Powers Resolution After Fifteen Years: A 
Reassessment, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 141, 160-62 (1988). 
"See HousE STUDY, supra note 18, at 224, 227, 234-36, 242-43, 252-53; Ely, Suppose 
Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L REV. 1379, 1380-81 (1988). 
On occasion, the legislative and executive branches have negotiated a compromise to avoid 
invocation of the Resolution. For example, a 1983 joint resolution, in contrast to the pro-
cedures specified in the War Powers Resolution, authorized the deployment of U.S. Marines 
in Lebanon for up to eighteen months. Multinational Force in Lebanon, Pub. L No. 98-
119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983) (codified at 50 U .S.C. § 1541 note (1988)). 
"See Ely, supra note 19, at 1383-85; Comment, supra note 18, at 171-73. 
"'See Gunther,judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeach-
ment Process, 22 UCLA L REv. 30 (1974). 
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deciding constitutional conflicts between Congress and the President.22 This 
approach would require substantial revision of the political question 
doctrine23 and would uphold interbranch accommodations that contra-
vened express textual provisions of the Constitution. A less extreme analysis 
would defer to arrangements devised by Congress and the President pro-
vided that those arrangements were consistent with the constitutional text. 
The goal would be to discourage litigation by persuading the political 
branches that resort to the judicial process would rarely succeed. This in 
turn might create incentives for the legislature and the executive to assess 
the stakes of their disputes more realistically and to fashion workable solu-
tions that would promote both free and responsible government. 
The recommendation against reliance upon judicial resolution of sepa-
ration of powers disputes between Congress and the President does not 
necessarily apply to other constitutional issues. The rationale for the rec-
ommendation in this context is that the legislative and executive branches 
generally have ample resources with which to protect themselves. That is 
not true, for example, in individual rights cases, where the party asserting 
a constitutional violation frequently lacks meaningful access to the political 
process as a means of self-defense. 21 
I. THE ALLOCATION OF POWERS IN THE CONSTITUTION 
The principle of separation of powers may be said to "define the very 
character of the American political system," 25 but giving precise content to 
22j. CHOPER, jUDfCIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263 (1980); see 
id. at 260-379. 
25Strauss, The Place of Agent:ies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 
84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 621 n.l94 (1984). 
24Analogous reasoning applies to interbranch controversies involving the federal judici-
ary. Many such controversies implicate concerns of individual rights. Moreover, the judicial 
branch does not participate in the give-and-take of the political process as do the legislative 
and executive branches. 
Similarly, this rationale may not apply in federalism disputes. To be sure, the Supreme 
Court has suggested that the structure of federal politics protects state interests and therefore 
obviates the need for judicial enforcement of the tenth amendment. Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-55 (1985). Numerous critics have pointed out that 
this reasoning exaggerates the extent to which the states are protected against federal en-
croachment. See, e.g., id. at 564-67 (Powell,]., dissenting); id. at 587-88 (O'Connor, j., dis-
senting); Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 15-17 (1988). Even if these criticisms understate the protections that the 
states enjoy in national politics, see Hero, The U.S. Congress and American Federalism: Are 
'Subnational' Governments Protected?, 42 W. POL. Q. 93 (1989), it remains true that the states 
do not participate directly in the federal government. By contrast, Congress and the President 
are the principal actors in a broad array of federal activities. 
25 G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 151 (1969). 
Indeed, the principle of separation of powers was "the characteristic that distinguished our 
system from all others conceived up to the time of our Constitution." Nixon v. Administrator 
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 507 (1977) (Burger, C.]., dissenting). 
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this principle has not proved easy. At times it has been said to prevent tyr-
anny, at others to promote workable government. 25 
The Constitutional Convention evaded the apparent conflict between lib-
erty and efficiency by means of a novel attempt to accommodate both goals. 27 
The framers established a government of separated powers assigned re-
spectively to legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 28 In doing so, how-
ever, they" rejected the "pure doctrine" of separation of powers, under which 
each branch is assigned a· unique function and may not intrude upon the 
function of any other branch, 29 in favor of a more ambiguous system of 
checks and balances, under which each branch was given a limited control 
over the exercise of the functions of the other branches. 30 A few familiar 
examples illustrate those interactions. Congress received the power to leg-
islate, but the President was given a qualified veto over bills approved by 
both the House and the Senate, which could in turn override an executive 
disapproval by a supermajority vote in each chamber. 31 Similarly, the Pres-
ident was designated as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, 32 but only 
Congress could declare war. 33 The President gained the power to make 
26Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (I926) (Brandeis,]., dissenting) ("The 
doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote 
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.") with Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) Qackson, J., concurring in the judgment) ("While 
the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice 
will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government."). 
"In fact, as many as five different theoretical justifications for the concept of separation 
of powers existed when the Constitutional Convention assembled. W. GwYN, THE MEANING 
OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS !27-28 (!965). Jn addition to the rationales of efficiency, 
see id. at 31-35; Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation of Powers Reconsidered, 35 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 7!5, 718-20, 72I-22 (1984), and liberty, see GWYN, supra, at 18-23, 40-43; M. VILE, 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 61-63 (1967), other rationales in-
cluded the rule of law, see GWYN, supra, at 52-58, 71-76, I 04-13, official accountability, see 
id. at 60-64, 85-87, and balancing· powers within the government, see id. at 55-56, 85-87. 
28Th is new scheme directly addressed two of the major problems of the Articles of Con-
federation. First, the Constitution gave the federal government explicit authority to tax and 
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. I, 3. Second, the 
new charter created a unitary executive. !d. art. II, § I, cl. I. These features suggest that 
considerations of efficiency played an important part in the drafting process. 
At the same time, the federal government was given only enumerated powers. This feature 
is most noticeable in the provisions dealing with the lawmaking function. Those provisions 
begin by stating that "[a]lllegislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of 
the United States ... . "/d. art. I,§ I. Later, Congress is explicitly granted certain authority, 
id. § 8, and forbidden to undertake other actions, id. § 9. These restrictions upon central 
authority suggest an effort to reduce the prospect of tyranny. 
29VILE, supra note 27, at 13-18. 
'"!d. at 18. Madison explained that separation of powers, properly understood, "did not 
mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts 
of each other." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302 Q. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. !961). Rather, 
he contended, tyranny impended only "where the whole power of one department is exer-
cised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department." /d. at 302-
03. 
"U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 7, cl. 2. 
"!d. art. II, § 2, cl. I. 
"!d. art. I, § 8, cl. II. 
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treaties, but only with the advice and consent of a supermajority of the 
Senate.34 The President also would appoint federal officers, but the Senate 
once again had to give its .advice and consent. 35 
Of course, the blending of powers in the Constitution greatly enhanced 
the possibilities of conflict between Congress and the President. This feature 
was not accidental. The framers recognized and accepted human frailty, 
most notably in Madison's famous comment that "[i]f men were angels, no 
government would be necessary. " 36 They therefore established a system 
designed to prevent overreaching by one branch at the expense of another 
and of liberty. 37 Instead of relying upon rigid functional boundaries, 38 the 
Constitution sought to provide officials of each branch with "the necessary 
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the 
others."39 To prevent overreaching, therefore, "[a]mbition must be made 
to counteract ambition."10 These ground rules would structure interbranch 
conflict, and would do so in ways that increased the likelihood of beneficial 
outcomes.41 
The President's qualified veto power, which already has been mentioned, 
illustrates this concept. Wary of pre-Revolution abuses of the royal prerog-
ative by the British crown, Americans hesitated to allow the President any 
power to disapprove legislation. 42 Nevertheless, many supported some such 
right as a means of protecting the executive from legislative encroach-
'''ld. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
35ld. 
36THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 O. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). One of Madison's 
coauthors added that government was instituted "[b]ecause the passions of men will not 
conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint." THE FEDERALIST No. 15, 
at 11 0 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961 ). 
"D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 137-38 (1984); M. WHITE, 
PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 97-98 (1987). 
38The framers rejected the definitional approach because they viewed it as unworkable. 
As Madison explained: 
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able 
to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces-the leg-
islative, executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the different 
legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the course of practice which prove the 
obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political 
science. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 228 Q. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also EPSTEIN, supra 
note 37, at 127; WHITE, supra note 37, at 103. 
39THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 36, at 321-22. 
40ld. at 322. It bears emphasis that "ambition" in this context does not imply that officials 
necessarily act with corrupt purposes when they seek excessive powers. WHITE, supra note 
37,at98. 
"H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 61 (1981); j. TULIS, THE 
RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 43-44, 45 (1987). 
42 L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 141 
(1985); R. SPITZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO 8-12, 21-22 (1988). 
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ment.·13 Because the President might refrain from exercising an absolute 
veto for fear of being labeled a despot;H the framers provided for a qualified 
presidential negative that would give Congress an opportunity to reconsider 
and give effect to a vetoed proposal if it attracted an unusually large measure 
of support. This seemingly less extreme authority, they reasoned, was si-
multaneously more likely to be used and less likely to offend, and therefore 
would serve as a potent weapon in the new government. 45 
Strikingly absent from these discussions of the benefits of interbranch 
political conflict as a mechanism for pron1oting effective, non tyrannical gov-
ernment is any mention of the judiciary as umpire of constitutional disputes 
bett.veen Congress and the President.46 That absence is not dispositive. After 
all, the Constitution does not expressly provide for judicial review, an insti-
tution dating to the earliest years of the RepublicY Nevertheless, the struc-
ture of the Constitution and the traditional arguments supporting judicial 
review suggest a comparatively modest role for the courts in resolving sep-
aration of powers disputes between the political branches. Unlike the claim-
ants in individual rights and perhaps also federalism disputes, 48 Congress 
and the President possess ample political resources with which to protect 
their interests. For this reason, and because the legislature and the chief 
executive aiso have the practical wisdom to determine for themselves the 
stakes of any particular controversy, courts should hesitate to insist upon 
comprehensive resolution of constitutional turf battles between the political 
branches. More important, the political branches themselves and the citi-
zenry at large should hesitate to seek judicial resolution of these issues. 
II. THE DIFFlCUL TY OF RECONCILING THE CASES 
The recent Supreme Court decisions addressing separation of powers dis-
putes between the legislative and executive branches have employed dis-
"Without some veto power, absolute or qualified, the President "might gradually be 
stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions or annihilated by a single vote. And in 
the one mode or the other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be 
blended in the same hands." THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 442 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961 ). Even some uppunems of the Constitution accepted this reasoning. SPITZER, supm note 
42, at 21; STORING, supra note 41, at 61. 
.,.,An absolute veto might be used too readily in "extraordinary" circumstances, thereby 
increasing the risk of executive aggrandizement or presidential tyranny. See THE FEDERALIST 
No. 51, supra note 36, at 323; SPITZER, supra note 42, at 12. 
"TilE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 43, at 444-46; SPITZER, supra note 42, at 17-20. 
·HiEPSTEIN, supra nole 37, at 140. 
·"This article focuses upon the utility rather than the legitimacy of judicial review of 
separation of powers disputes between the legislative and executive branches of the federal 
government. The legitimacy of judicial review as a general proposition is beyond the scope 
of the present discussion. The literature on that topic is so large that a disinterested observer 
"might well conclude that today this is not just the first but the only issue on the agenda of 
constitutional scholars." Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 
1331, 1331 ( 1988). Suffice it to say that supporters of the Constitution argued that the courts 
would have the power to invalidate legislation. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466-69 (A. 
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter eel. 1961). 
"See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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tinctive analytical techniques. At times, the Court has applied a strictly formal 
approach emphasizing the essential separateness of the branches and un-
derscoring the importance of allowing each to function as master in its own 
sphere. At others, the Court has followed a more pragmatic course, focusing 
upon the existence of checks and balances to prevent the accumulation of 
unopposed authority that could lead to arbitrary action by a single branch. 
The analytical scheme selected determined the outcome of every case de-
cided during the 1 980s.49 Despite the existence of parallel lines of cases, the 
Court has failed almost completely even to acknowledge its contrasting 
methodologies in separation of powers disputes, much less explain how or 
why it chose which methodology in any particular case.50 
Several recent decisions have suggested that the key to understanding the 
differing outcomes is whether one branch has sought to aggrandize its power 
at the expense of another. 51 Unfortunately, the aggrandizement-nonag-
grandizement distinction is difficult to apply coherently. Any measure that 
reallocates authority from one branch to another can be said both to in-
crease the power of the branch which gains new authority and to diminish 
the power of the branch which loses authority that it previously possessed. 52 
Consider, for example, Bowsher v. Synar53 and CFTC v. Schor, 54 which were 
decided on the same day. Bowsher applied formalist reasoning to invalidate 
an arrangement under which an official supposedly subservient to Congress 
was given authority to impose spending reductions that otherwise would 
49For applications offormalism, see Bowsher v. Synar, 4 78 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919 (1983). For applications of the checks-and-balances approach, see Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline, 490 U.S. 212 (1989); 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
The sole exception to this pattern was Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-41 (1976) (per 
curiam), in which the Court endorsed a relatively pragmatic approach to separation of powers 
problems but found that the method for selecting members of the Federal Election Com-
mission violated the express terms of the appointments clause. 
50Judicial acknowledgments of analytical inconsistencies in recent separation of powers 
jurisprudence appear primarily in dissenting opinions. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 725-27 (Scalia, 
]., dissenting); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 865 (1986) (Brennan,]., dissenting). Commen-
tators who take different positions on the proper method for resolving separation of powers 
disputes express equal dissatisfaction with the Court's failure to address the analytical incon-
sistencies in its jurisprudence in this field. See, e.g., Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 105, llO, 113, 116-17 (1988) (advocating relatively formal approach to 
separation of powers problems); Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a·Principle: A Comment on 
the Burger Court's jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. I 083, 1084-
85, 1 097-1 01 ( 1987) (advocating relatively pragmatic approach to separation of powers prob-
lems). 
"Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381-83; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693; Schor, 478 U.S. at 856-57. 
52See Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics and the Tenure Powers in the 
Court, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1150-51 (1988); Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of 
Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1288-89 (1988); Strauss, Formal and Functional 
Approaches to Separation-ofPowers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
488, 517 ( 1987). Professor Krent attempts to demonstrate the point algebraically. Krent, 
supra, at 1288 n.14l. 
53478 u.s. 714 (1986). 
54 478 u.s. 833 (1986). 
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have been directed by the President. Schor, by contrast, used a functionalist· 
analysis to uphold an arrangement under which an administrative agency 
was given authority to decide certain common law claims that otherwise 
would have been resolved by the courts. The Court tried. to distinguish the 
two cases on the ground that only Bowsher involved aggiandizement by one 
branch at the expense of another. 55 
This distinction is not persuasive. Even if Congress did not expressly usurp 
judicial power in Schor,56 it left the judiciary with a smaller proportion of 
federal power than that branch otherwise would have had. By the same 
token, the statute at issue in Bowsher allowed Congress, by passing a deficit-
reduction measure over a presidential veto, to act unilaterally. Hence, even 
if one accepts the dubious assumption that the procedure for removing the 
Comptroller General rendered that official subservient to the legislative 
branch, 57 the extent of congressional aggrandizement might well have been 
substantially less in Bowsher than in Schor. Nevertheless, the arrangement in 
Bowsher was invalidated while that in Schor was upheld. The arrangements 
approved in other recent decisions also involved reallocations of authority 
comparable to that rejected in Bowsher. 58 
The infirmities of the Court's approach have prompted several commen-
tators to propose alternative reconciliations of these cases. Academic for-
malists have suggested that the cases turn on considerations of the 
constitutional limitations upon how each branch may act. 59 Those adhering 
to a functionalist perspective have tried to harmonize the cases with refer-
ence to a more holistic focus upon the quality and extent of interbranch 
relationships that vindicate underlying structural principles of the Consti-
tution. 50 Despite the impressive talents of their proponents, these theories 
55ld. at 856-57. 
56ln one sense, Congress did arrogate power to itself by conferring the adjudicatory 
authority in question upon the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The CFTC is an 
"independent agency." ld. at 836. Members of the legislative branch often regard inde-
pendent agencies as creatures of Congress. Miller, Independent Agencies, I 986 SuP. CT. REV. 
41, 63-64. From this perspective, Schor might indeed involve an attempt at congressional 
aggrandizement of authority at the expense of another branch. 
5
'Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 730. For a critical analysis of the assumption that the procedure 
for removing the Comptroller General rendered that official subservient to Congress, see 
Entin, supfa note 15, at 759-62. 
581n Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline, 490 U.S. 212 (1989), the executive branch gained 
the power to impose user fees that otherwise would have rested with Congress. In Mistretta 
v. United States, 488 U.S. 36I (1989), the judicial branch received the power to determine 
the permissible range of criminal sentences, authority that otherwise belonged to Congress. 
In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the judicial branch obtained authority over law 
enforcement that otherwise would have been exercised by the executive. Even if character-
ized as congressional giveaways rather than executive or judicial usurpations, the arrange-
ments in these two cases changed the interbranch balance of power. The provision in Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings authorizing Congress alone to prevent sequestration from occurring makes 
it difficult to maintain that the magnitude of the reallocation of power in Bowsher exceeded 
that in any of the cases discussed in this footnote. 
59 E.g., Krent, supra note 52, at 1256-58, 1273-98. 
'"E.g., Strauss, supra note 52, at 5I7-2I; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 495-96. 
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are problematic. For example, some do not in fact account for the outcome 
of all of the recent separation of powers cases. 5 1 Moreover, formalism, as 
Bowsher demonstrates, can attach enormous legal weight to factors that have 
little actual significance. By contrast, functionalism can yield such divergent 
conclusions that even its adherents caution against the possibility of "con-
scious or unconscious manipulation. " 62 Thus, this approach may be "more 
effective as a means of organizing debate than as a rule for deciding cases. " 63 
The difficulty of reconciling the cases arises less from the idiosyncrasies 
or intellectual deficiencies of judges than from the intractable nature of the 
subject. 54 No unitary approach to this subject can take account of its logical 
and empirical complexities. The unsatisfactory judicial performance and the 
inadequacies of existing theories also suggest that Dean Choper might have 
had a more valuable insight than he.has received credit for when he urged 
the Supreme Court to refrain from deciding separation of powers disputes 
between Congress and the President; such disputes would be resolved 
through bargaining and accommodation between the political branches.65 
To the extent that his proposal rests upon the notion that judicial decisions 
in this field squander limited institutional capital that should be saved for 
more urgent individual rights cases, 66 it has received justifiable criticism _57 
On the other hand, this proposal has the virtue of forcing us to confront 
the limitations as well as the benefits of judicial review in a field where 
"'Professor Krent, a formalist, and Professor Pierce, a functionalist, both found the Sen-
tencing Commission unconstitutional under their theories. Krent, supra note 52, at 1311-
16; Pierce, Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, and the Structure of Government, 1988 SuP. 
CT. REv. 1, 36. The Court, on the other hand, upheld the validity of the Sentencing Com-
mission in Mistretta. Professor Pierce sought to avoid the implications of his theory by treating 
the placement of the Commission in the judicial branch as a slip of the legislative pen. Pierce, 
supra, at 37. 
62Strauss, supra note 23, at 617. A critic of this approach charges that functionalism serves 
as "a shield behind which courts could rationalize their decisions to restructure governmental 
arrangements, but it does not provide them with useful criteria as to when and in what 
circumstances that restructuring is needed." Gifford, The Separation of Powers Doctrine and 
the Regulatory Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 441, 479 (1987). 
The indeterminacy of functionalism is illustrated by the Bowsher case. Justice White dem-
onstrated in detail that the procedure for removing the Comptroller General, which served 
as the centerpiece of the Court's opinion, posed no real threat of congressional usurpation 
of executive authority. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 770-75 (1986) (White,]., dissenting). 
Professor Strauss, probably the leading academic functionalist, criticized justice White's anal-
ysis for failing to look beyond the removal procedure to "the general framework of rela-
tionships among the GAO, Congress, President, and courts." Strauss, supra note 52, at 520; 
see id. at 498-99, 519-21. 
"'Strauss, supra note 23, at 625 (footnote omitted). 
64See Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1, 27-28; 
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 805-07 (1982). 
65 CHOPER, supra note 22, at 263; see id. at 260-379. 
60ld. at 131-40, 156-70. 
67 Dean Choper offered no persuasive evidence that public reaction to rulings upholding 
individual liberties has been affected in any way by the results in separation of powers cases. 
See Merritt, supra note 24, at 17 n.101 (collecting criticisms of this aspect of Choper's rea-
soning). 
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principled decisions are difficult to construct and so basic a question as the 
proper method of analysis remains unpredictable. The suggestion of judicial 
deference or abstention in separation of powers disputes has elicited con-
cerns that one branch might use its short-term bargaining advantage to 
effect permanent and deleterious changes in the relative allocation of pow-
ers. 58 These concerns are legitimate, but they should not be exaggerated. 
As noted in the introduction to this article, the judiciary has played no role 
or only a marginal one in many important conflicts between Congress and 
the President, including those involving the Tenure of Office Act, the War 
Powers Resolution, and Watergate. 
These considerations do not necessarily establish the mgency of Dean 
Choper's proposal. The original structure of the Federal Election Commis-
sion, which was invalidated in Buckley v. Valeo 69 for violating the appoint-
ments clause, shows that Congress and the President, left to their own devices, 
might agree to arrangements that contradict the allocation of authority ex-
pressly provided in the text of the Constitution.70 That prospect suggests 
the need for some judicial role in separation of powers disputes. The ex-
periences with the Tenure of Office Act, the War Powers Resolution, and 
Watergate should remind us, however, that the political branches have their 
own resources and responsibilities in this field. That ~in turn counsels against 
excessive reliance upon the judiciary as the ultimate arbiter of legislative-
executive controversies. The Supreme Court itself recently cautioned against 
gratuitous judicial resolution of such a constitutional turf battle. 71 Parts III 
and IV examine the reasons for this caution. 
III. THE POLITICAL BRANCHES AND 
SEPARATION OF POWERS DISPUTES 
Enthusiasts of judicial resolution of separation of powers disputes between 
the political branches reason from two essential premises. One is that the 
political branches are unqualified to interpret the Constitution. The other 
is that interbranch differences pose unacceptable risks to the quality of pub-
lic policy. Both of these premises are misleading at best. 
The assumption that only the judiciary can resolve constitutional disputes 
between Congress and the President has at least two unfortunate conse-
quences. First, elected officials might refrain from evaluating the constitu-
"See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 62, at 44 7-48; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 494-95. 
"424 U.S. 1, 109-43 (1976) (per curiam). 
'"This concern recently led a lower court to invalidate the method for appointing the 
first head of the agency charged with implementing reforms in the savings-and-loan industry. 
That court explained that "[t]he President and the Congress, whether alone or together, 
cannot decide to circumvent the Constitution's requirements." Olympic Fed. Savings & Loan 
Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 732 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 n.9 (D.D.C.), appeal 
dismissed, 903 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
"American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153, 161 (1989). 
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tionality of practices or proposals that come before them for consideration. 
Second, legislators and chief executives might seek to disguise their oppo-
sition to the wisdom of such practices or proposals by structuring them so 
as to leave them vulnerable to lawsuits challenging their constitutionality. 
These avoidance and camouflage techniques might insulate politicians from 
the discomfort associated with making hard choices, but they also debase 
the quality of deliberation about public policy. 
These are not purely hypothetical concerns. As to the first, several mem-
bers of the House Judiciary Committee voted against the article charging 
President Nixon with committing impeachable offenses by defying congres-
sional subpoenas on the ground that only the courts could determine the 
validity of the subpoenas. 72 As to the second, the Democratic leadership of 
the House of Representatives, which opposed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act, supported specific provisions that they believed would make a consti-
tutional challenge to the statute more likely to succeed. 73 
The abhorrence of interbranch conflict also reflects a very different view 
of the process of government than the one embodied in the Constitution. 
The framers constructed an elaborate set of checks and balances to structure 
the relationship between the political branches. Adherence to these ground 
rules was expected to prevent overreaching by one branch and to discourage 
the enactment of unsound proposals. Excessive reliance upon the judiciary 
to resolve legislative-executive turf battles threatens to undermine the ben-
efits of this scheme. This prospect should be troublesome to all citizens, 
regardless of their general views about originalism in constitutional inter-
pretation. 
A. Constitutional Interpretation by the 
Political Branches 
The Supreme Court determined at an early date that the judicial branch 
has the duty "to say what the law is." 74 This statement has served as the 
72 H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Con g., 2d Sess. 360-61, 485-87 (I 974) (minority views); id. at 
504-0S (additional views of Mr. Railsback); id. at 507-08 (additional views of Mr. Dennis); id. 
at 520-23 (additional views of Mr. Froehlich in opposition to article III); Debate on Articles of 
Impeachment: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4SS-S6 
(I 974) (remarks of Rep. Froehlich); id. at 469-70 (remarks of Rep. Smith); id. at 4 73, 474 
(remarks of Rep. Railsback). 
"'Ellwood, The Politics of the Enactment and Implementation of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings: Why 
Congress Cannot Address the Deficit Dilemma, 25 HARV.]. ON LEGIS. 553, 564 (I 988). Among 
these must have been the assignment of authority to implement automatic spending reduc-
tions to the Comptroller General, an official subject to unilateral removal by Congress in 
apparent violation of the teaching of Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (I 926). See E. 
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION iii-iv (I 927); L. 
jAFFE & N. NATHANSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 162 (4th ed. 
I 976); Note, The Comptroller General of the United States: The Broad Power To Settle and Adjust 
All Claims and Accounts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 350, 351 n.I2 (1956). This was, of course, the 
basis for the holding in Bowsher. 
'"Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. (I Cra~ch) 137,177 (1803). 
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predicate for the view that the Court has ultimate, if not exclusive, authority 
in constitutional interpretation. 75 For this reason, many observers regard 
with trepidation any suggestion for restricting the role of the judiciary in 
separation of powers disputes between Congress and the President. Yet the 
status of the Supreme Court as sole expositor of the Constitution has not 
been universally accepted. For example, Andrew Jackson refused to regard 
the ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland 76 as having settled the constitutionality 
of the Bank of the United States. In vetoing a bill to recharter the Bank, 
Jackson v.rrote: 
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by 
its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to 
support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and 
not as it is understood by others .... The authority of the Supreme Court must 
not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when 
acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force 
of their reasoning may deserve. 77 
Abraham Lincoln made his opposition to the Dred Scott decision78 an im-
portant part of his unsuccessful campaign for the Senate in 1858.79 He later 
broadened his attack on the ~~judicja] monopoly" theo1y of constltutiona] 
interpretation. 80 In his first inaugural address, Lincoln explained: 
I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are 
to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be 
binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object of that suit, while 
they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases 
by all other departments of the Government. ... At the same time, the candid 
citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions 
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme 
Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in per-
sonal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that 
"E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 
18 (1958). 
"17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
"2 A CO~IPILATION Of THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS Of THE PRESIDENTS. 1789-1897, at 
576,582 u. Richardson ed. 1896) (hereinafter MESSAGES AND PM'ERS OF THE PRESIDENTS). 
'"Dred Scoll v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
"For example, during the Lincoln-Douglas Debates, Lincoln accepted the Dred Scali 
decision as conclusive of the rights of the parties to that case but explained that he would 
"refus[e] to obey it as a political rule. If I were in Congress, and a vote should come up on 
a question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new territory, in spite of that Dred 
Scott decision, I would vote that it should." 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS Of ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
495 (R. Basler ed. 1953). 1n a subsequent debate, Lincoln added that he opposed Dred Scott 
"as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it 
wrong, which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no 
measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision." 3 id. at 255. 
""This term is used in Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 97, 100 & n.5 (1988) (citing D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 89-96 
(1966)). 
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extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent 
tribunal. 81 
Similar views were expressed both before and after these statements. 
Thomas jefferson pardoned those convicted under the Sedition Act of 179882 
despite judicial rulings upholding the constitutionality of the statute. 83 More 
recently, President Franklin D. Roosevelt vigorously attacked Supreme Court 
rulings invalidating important aspects of his legislative agenda. 84 During the 
Watergate investigation, President Nixon implied that he might disregard 
a Supreme Court directive to comply with the special prosecutor's subpoena 
unless that ruling was "definitive. " 85 Finally, former Attorney General Ed-
win Meese kindled fierce debate with a speech asserting that "constitutional 
interpretation is not the business of the Court only, but also properly the 
business of all branches of government." 86 
Perhaps these examples can be discounted as the sour grapes of those 
whose positions the Supreme Court rejected. Nevertheless, other powerful 
considerations support an independent role for the political branches in 
constitutional interpretation in separation of powers disputes between Con-
gress and the President. At the most basic level, elected officials must take 
an oath to uphold the Constitution. 87 Faithfulness to their oath necessarily 
requires members of Congress and the President to consider the constitu-
81 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 77, at 5, 9. 
82Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801). 
"'As Jefferson explained in 1804 in a letter to Abigail Adams: 
[Nlothing in the Constitution has given [the judges] a right to decide for the executive, 
more than to the executive to decide for them. Both magistrates are equally independent 
in the sphere of action assigned to them .... [The Constitution J meant that its coordinate 
branches should be checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the 
right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in 
their own sphere of action, but for the Legislature and executive also, in their spheres, 
would make the judiciary a despotic branch. 
4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 560, 561 (H. Washington ed. 1854). 
84G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (11th ed. 1985). The judicial hostility to Roo-
sevelt's program led to the ill-fated Court-packing plan. L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIA-
LOGUES 209-15 (1988); Leuchtenburg, The Case of the Contentious Commissioner: Humphreys' 
(sic) Executor v. U.S., in FREEDOM AND REFORM 276, 310-11 (H. Hyman & L. Levy eds. 
1967). 
85E. DREW, WASHINGTON JOURNAL 5, 45, 283, 304-05, 328 (1975). One of President 
Nixon's advisors was widely quoted as saying: "We're leading ourselves into believing the 
Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of,all disputes, and I don't believe it. I think there are 
times when the President of the United States would be right in not obeying a decision of 
the Supreme Court." Id. at 21. 
86Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985 (1987). For a compilation 
of popular and academic responses to this speech, see Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of 
Supreme Court Decisions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 977-1095 (1987). 
In an earlier and less publicized episode, Mr. Meese suggested that the executive branch 
might not deem itself bound by an adverse judicial ruling in a separation of powers dispute. 
Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889-90 (3d Cir.), on 
reh'g, 809 F.2d 979,991-92 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988). 
87The presidential oath is prescribed in U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 7. The requirement 
that members of Congress (as well as federal judges and all state officials) pledge to "support 
this Constitution" appears in id. art. VI, cl. 3. 
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tionality of proposed policies as an important aspect of performing their 
duties. 88 
Beyond the implications of the oath requirement, the Constitution im-
poses affirmative obligations upon elected officials. Several provisions spe-
cifically proscribe certain kinds of Iegislation, 89 and a number expressly 
authorize the passage of implementing statutes.90 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court itself has held that Congress is not strictly bound by judicial interpre-
tations of equal protection in enforcing the fourteenth amendment through 
legislation. 91 ~A.Lccordingly, the political branches cannot escape the necessity 
of assessing the constitutionality of at least some policy proposals. 
In addition, the judiciary cannot resolve every constitutional issue. Article 
Ill restricts the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases and controversies. 92 
Hence, the judicial branch cannot provide advisory opinions to Congress 
and the President on the constitutionality of a proposed bill or program. 93 
Correlatively, only those with standing to sue may challenge the constitu-
tionality of government policies. If too many persons are affected by a par-
ticular policy, no private party will have standing to litigate a generalized 
grievance. 9 -1 Even if that obstacle is surmounted, other barriers to standing 
00FISHEH, supm note 84, at 233-34; Bessette & Tulis, The Constitution, Politics, and the 
Presidency, in THE PRESIDENCY iN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 3, ] ] Q. Bessette & j. Tulis 
eds. 1981); Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. 
L. REV. 585, 587 (I975); Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Pmtection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 
311,313-14 (1987). 
"''E.g .. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting, inter alia, bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, 
expenditures not authorized by a duly enacted appropriations statute, and titles of nobility, 
and limiting the grounds for suspending habeas corpus); id. amend. I (prohibiting laws that 
establish religion or abridge freedom of religion, speech, press, and assembly); id. amend. V 
(prohibiting, inter alia, double jeopardy, self-incrimination, deprivation without due process 
of life, liberty, or property, and uncompensated takings of private property). 
00E.g., id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XIX, § 
2; id. amend. XXIII,§ 2; id. amend. XXIV,§ 2; id. amend. XXVI,§ 2. 
"'The leading case is Katzen bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). For discussion of the 
role of the legislative branch in interpreting the fourteenth amendment, see L TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 5-14, at 334-50 (2d ed. 1988); Burt, Miranda and Title 
II: !l Morganatic Marriage, I969 Sur. CT. REV. 81; Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due 
Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); Ross, supra note 88. 
"'U.S. CONST. art. 1Il, § 2, cl. 1. 
"' Some state courts do have the authority to issue advisory opinions. A prominent ex-
ample is Massachusetts, where Governor Michael Dukakis's decision to veto a mandatory 
nag-salute law in response to the advice of his state's highest court, Opinion of the Justices 
to the Governor, 372 Mass. 874, 363 N .E.2d 251 (1977), became an unusually salient issue 
in the 1988 presidential campaign. See generally j _ GERMOND &j. WITCOVER, WHOSE BROAD 
STRIPES AND BRIGHT STARS? 7-8, 160, 359, 460 (1989); Drew, Letter from Washington, NEW 
YORKER, Oct. ] 0, 1988, at 96, 96-97. 
94See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church 
& State, Inc, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 
u.s. 208 (1974). 
The standing of members of Congress to litigate the validity of governmental activities 
remains unsettled. The Supreme Court expressly declined to address that issue in Bowsher 
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986), and avoided the merits in a subsequent case in which 
the question was squarely presented. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). Most of the 
jurisprudence on this question has arisen in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
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might well prevent the litigation of an appreciable number of separation of 
powers disputes. 95 Moreover, the Court has various devices to avoid decid-
ing the merits of cases over which it does have jurisdiction.95 In each of 
these situations, the absence of judicial resolution of the merits effectively 
requires members of Congress and the President to determine the consti-
tutionality of governmental activities for themselves. 
Finally, as a practical matter, Congress and the President already interpret 
the Constitution. That document fixes important political understandings 
that typically go unremarked because of their broad acceptance. For ex-
ample, no controversy exists over the eligibility standards or the duration 
of terms for federal elected officials. Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and 
Ronald Reagan did not seek third terms because all concerned understood 
that the twenty-second amendment precluded them from doing so; Edward 
Kennedy did not seek his brother John's Senate seat in 1961 because article 
I made clear that a twenty-nine-year-old, no matter how prominent or well-
District of Columbia Circuit, which has recognized congressional standing in some cases. See, 
e.g., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 
479 U.S. 361 (1987); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The concept of 
congressional standing has been controversial even in that court. See, e.g., Barnes, 759 F.2d 
at 43-56 (Bork, J ., dissenting); Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 
946, 957-61 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985). 
At the same time, the D.C. Circuit has limited congressional access to judicial relief under 
a doctrine known as "equitable discretion," which results in the dismissal of some cases in 
which the congressional plaintiff is found to have standing and where no other devices for 
avoiding the merits are available. See, e.g., Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 
561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 
1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 
656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981). This doctrine also has proved 
controversial. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Melcher v. 
Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d at 565 n.4; id. at 565 (Edwards,]., concurring); Barnes, 
759 F.2d at 59-61 (Bork, J., dissenting); Moore, 733 F.2d at 961-64 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
For a comprehensive discussion, see No.te, Equitable Discretion to Dismiss Congressional-Plaintiff 
Suits: A Reassessment, 40 CASE W. RES. "L. REV. 1075 (1990). 
95 ln order to establish standing, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-prong test of injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751 (I 984); Valley Forge Chris-
tian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,472 
(1982). The jurisprudence of standing has been notably erratic, but recent decisions have 
adopted a markedly restrictive approach. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); City 
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490(1975). 
96Among these avoidance techniques are the political question and ripeness doctrines. 
The former holds that the issue in dispute is inappropriate for judicial resolution at any time, 
whereas the latter views the controversy as prematurely presented to the courts. 
The political question doctrine has been distinctly out of favor with the Supreme Court 
in recent decades. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 4 78 U.S. I 09, 121-27 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919, 940-43 (1983); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974); Powell 
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,·518-49 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962). But 
see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, I 002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. I, I 0-11 (1973). Lower courts have made greater 
use of the doctrine during this period. See Mulhern, supra note 80, at 106-08 nn.25-31 
(collecting cases). 
The leading case on ripeness is Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
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connected, could not hold the position. Similarly, despite the struggle over 
the legislative veto, no one questions that bills must satisfy the bicameralism 
and presentation requirements to become laws, or that the Senate must 
confirm ambassadors, federal judges, and other officers of the United 
States. 97 Indeed, during Watergate, members of Congress from both parties 
believed that President Nixon's defiance of a Supreme Court ruling in the 
litigation over the White House tape recordings would both justify and as-
sure his impeachment and removal from office, a conclusion for which no 
judicia] precedent existed. 98 Thus, the question is not "\vhether the political 
branches will interpret the Constitution but under what circumstances they 
will rio so. 
B. The Benefits of Interbranch 
Constitutional Debate 
The preceding section demonstrated that legislative and executive eval-
uation of the constitutional issues raised in separation of powers disputes 
between Congress and the President is appropriate. This section further 
suggests that such consideration is desirable. To be sure, independent con-
stitutional interpretation by nonjudicial officials holds out the prospect of 
disagreement between the political branches on fundamental issues. Al-
though many modern commentators view interbranch conflict with dis-
taste,99 the Constitution was designed to facilitate debate among elected 
officials on importaJ!t public questions. This debate might lead to stalemate; 
but it also could stimulate more thoughtful public policy. The latter prospect 
suggests that Congress and the President should be discouraged from re-
lying too much upon the judiciary as arbiter of separation of powers disputes 
and encouraged to reach workable accommodations that do not coi1travene 
the constitutional text. 
As noted earlier, the framers of the Constitution recognized the possibility 
that one branch would seek to encroach upon the power of another, thereby 
jeopardizing the core value of freedom upon which the new government 
rested. 100 To minimize this possibility, each branch was given sufficient power 
and incentives to resist attempted usurpations. Because the framers feared 
legislative aggrandizement, 101 they made Congress bicameral and gave the 
President a qualified veto. At the same time, the unfortunate experience 
"'See Bessette & Tulis, supra note 88, at 9-10; Schauer, Eas)' Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 
399,414 (1985). 
""See DREW, supra note 85, at 41, 43, 51, 283, 292; Bessette & Tulis, supra note 88, at 9. 
'"'N. POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 202 (4th ed. 1986). Professor Polsby is not 
one of those commentators. See id. 
"'"See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text. 
""Perhaps the most famous expression of this concern is Madison's observation that "'[i]n 
republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates." THE FEDERALIST 
No. 51, supra note 36, at 322. Madison also complained that "[t]he legislative department is 
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous 
vortex." THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 Q. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
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under the British made all concerned acutely aware of the dangers of un-
checked executive power, which was "carefully limited" in article II. 102 Sig-
nificantly, however, the Constitution did not explicitly define the respective 
powers of each branch, and its supporters discounted the value of "parch-
ment barriers" against overreaching. 103 Despite the availability of judicial 
review, Congress and the President were expected to rely primarily upon 
their own political self-defense mechanisms when interbranch disputes arose. 
In short, the framers did not contemplate an active judicial role in sepa-
ration of powers disputes. This crude originalism cannot end the discussion, 
however. After all, the framers also created a system oflimited government. 
A faithful adherent to the founding design might argue that the courts 
should rigorously enforce the separation of powers to protect the core con-
stitutional value of liberty. This argument takes on added strength in light 
of the vastly increased scale of federal activities compared with the role of 
the central government envisioned in the last decades of the eighteenth 
century. 
Two responses to this claim are available. First, the Supreme Court in 
recent years has tried to give effect to the founding design. As Part II of 
this article seeks to demonstrate, the results of this enterprise have been 
unsatisfactory. An originalist might rejoin that these difficulties have arisen 
from the Court's failure to apply a strict separation principle with sufficient 
consistency. That point leads directly into the second response to the orig-
inalist position: the framers lacked a detailed vision of the institutional im-
plications of the separation of powers doctrine and did not contemplate a 
regime of rigid formality in this field. 104 The absence of such a vision might 
help to explain the difficulties of the recent judicial opinions on this subject. 
Because the Constitution does not yidd conclusive answers to these ques-
tions and because Congress and the President have both the resources and 
the incentive to defend their positions, disputes of this kind are appropri-
ately addressed primarily in the political arena. 
At bottom, these disputes involve questions about the role of government 
in American life. In general, those who advocate strict maintenance of in-
terbranch boundaries believe in a comparatively limited federal role. Al-
though the Supreme Court has dealt with the subject only obliquely, 105 several 
commentators have recognized the political implications of these conflicts. 
Rigid demarcation between the executive and legislative branches, accord-
102THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 101, at 309. See also EPSTEIN, supra note 37, at 132. 
103THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 101, at 308-09. 
104 GWYN, supra note 27, at 128; Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions 
and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211,212,224,239-42,260-61 (1989); Shane, Inde-
pendent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
596,616-17 (1989). 
105See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,722 (1986) (separation of powers "provide[s] avenues 
for the operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power"); INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919,959 (1983) (separation of powers operates to "define and limit the exercise of. .. 
federal powers"). 
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ing to this view, would make it more difficult for the federal government 
to act. A strong delegation doctrine would force Congress to make hard 
policy choices about contentious subjects; the more specific the statute must 
be, the greater the possibility that opponents could defeat it. The absence 
of the legislative veto would discourage Congress from authorizing agencies 
to promulgate regulations that could be overturned only through the reg-
ular legislative process with all its complexities and pitfalls. And giving the 
President unfettered removal authority and absolute control over all offi-
cials exercising executive power would make Congress less willing to permit 
agencies from which the legislature would be effectively insulated. 106 The 
political compromises leading to the creation of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission suggest that this view is 
not entirely implausible. 107 
Whether or not rigorous adherence to separation of powers principles 
would reduce the federal role, 108 powerful legal arguments exist for a more 
permissive constitutional analysis in this field. Among them are the flexibil-
ity inherent in a Constitution that does not rigidly define the authority of 
the legislative and executive branches, the apparent pragmatism of the fra-
mers in addressing problems of administration, the wide (though not unlim-
ited) latitude afforded to Congress under the necessary and proper clause 
to structure the government, and the twentieth-century breakdown of what-
10
'See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS I6-I7 (I985); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of 
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. I, 63-64 (I982); Epstein, Self-Interest and the Con-
stitution, 37]. LEGAL Enuc. I 53, I 56 (I987); Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles, 36 AM. 
U.L. REv. 345, 349 (I987). 
107See R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS I77-87 (194I) (ICC); 
S. SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE I38-50 (I982) (FTC). 
108It is difficult to assess the accuracy of this hypothesis. In Chadha, the Supreme Court 
held that statutes containing unconstitutional legislative vetoes could remain in force if the 
objectionable veto provisions were severable. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 93I-32. The Court en-
dorsed a severability criterion that would uphold a partially unconstitutional statute "[u]nless 
it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within 
its power, independently of that which is not." Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 
286 u.s. 2IO, 234 (I932). 
Applying that standard reveals the difficulty of predicting what Congress would do under 
a stricter separation of powers regime. The Chadha majority found the legislative veto pro-
vision severable from the remainder of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Chadha, 462 
U.S. at 932-35.Justice Rehnquist, after examining the identical historical record, found that 
it was not. I d. at I 0 I3-I6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Similarly, the Court summarily affirmed 
a finding of severability in one of Chadha's companion cases despite strong indications that 
the measure in question would not have been enacted without the veto. See Consumer Energy 
Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 440-45 (D.C. Cir. I982), ajj'd mem. sub nom. Process 
Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. I2I6 (I983). The 
evidence to the contrary included protracted congressional consideration of the statute, 
which passed the House by only one vote after its proponents emphasized the availability of 
legislative vetoes of objectionable agency rules. See Miller, supra note 56, at 89-90 n.I75; 
Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
427,447 (I989). 
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ever earlier consensus had existed in favor of strictly limited government. 109 
Wide public support remains for an enlarged federal role, as the contem-
porary difficulty of reducing the budget deficit attests. 110 In these circum-
stances, a sustained effort to invalidate government programs on separation 
of powers grounds could threaten a political crisis comparable to the one 
that arose from the Supreme Court's overturning many of the early New 
Deal reforms. 111 
The optimum solution to this conflict is for partisans of the competing 
approaches to argue over their political disagreements in political settings. 
This solution has several advantages over reliance upon the courts. First, 
the difficulties of producing consistent, principled answers to these prob-
lems suggests that the concept of separation of powers provides less a rule 
of decision than a heuristic concept for structuring analysis. 112 Second, in-
terbranch negotiation rather than judicial determination acknowledges the 
political contingencies involved in many separation of powers disputes. As 
noted above, supporters of a strong doctrine in this field traditionally have 
also endorsed limited government. For that reason, advocates of a more 
activist state generally have denigrated the separation principle as an anach-
ronism at best and an obstacle to essential reforms at worst. 113 This pattern 
has not always existed, however. For example, in the 1970's the principal 
proponents of legislative authority as a means of recapturing the proper 
interbranch allocation of power supported a greater federal role; the de-
fenders of expansive presidential prerogatives favored a smaller central gov-
'
0
'Perhaps the leading academic advocates of this perspective have been Professors Strauss 
and Sunstein. See, e,g., Strauss, supra note 23; Sunstein, supra note 3. On the necessary and 
proper clause, see Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the 
President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring I976, at I 02. 
110See R. EISNER, How REAL IS THE FEDERAL DEFICIT? I60-6I (I986); D. STOCKMAN, THE 
TRIUMPH OF POLITICS 8-9, 376-77,390-92 (I986). 
"'Political prediction is a notoriously risky affair. Nevertheless, the intense opposition to 
the failed Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bark, which reflected concern over the 
threat of significant changes in constitutional law, suggests that a separation of powers jur-
isprudence which invalidated many environmental, health, and safety programs would stim-
ulate widespread controversy. Even Professor Epstein, a leading academic proponent of 
limited government, recognizes the difficulty of wholesale judicial reversal of objectionable 
legal doctrine. EPSTEIN, supra note I 06, at 306-07, 329; Epstein, The Proper Scope of the 
Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. I387, I387, 1454-55 (I987). 
'"See Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
592,602 (1986). 
113 For modern expositions of this view, see, e.g.,]. BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY 
(I963); Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 FoREIGN AFF. I26 (I980). Similar conceptions 
undergirded the Progressive critique of American politics developed most conspicuously by 
Woodrow Wilson. See Tuus, supra note 4I, at II9-24; see also Mahoney, A Newer Science of 
Politics: The Federalist and American Political Science in the Progressive Era, in SAVING THE 
REVOLUTION 250, 251-61 (C. Kesler ed. I987). 
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ernment. 114 Moreover, the leading separation of powers cases in recent years 
have been advanced not by advocates of smaller government but by cham-
pions of a more aggressive federal role. The challenges to the constitutionc 
ality of the legislative veto in Chadha, the deficit-reduction mechanism of 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings in Bowsher, and the Sentencing Commission in 
Mistretta v. United States 115 were brought by advocates of more vigorous 
government regulation. These proponents of a more activist state believe 
that strict adherence to separation of powers principles will reduce the in-
fluence of industry, trade, and other special interests and thereby facilitate 
the development and implementation of effective programs to protect pub-
lic health and safety. 116 Thus, committed advocates of contrasting substan-
tive political visions might find it advantageous not to have separation of 
powers disputes resolved by the courts because short-term judicial victories 
for one side might have sobering longer-term implications when the other 
side controls the government. 11 7 
Third, and most significant, reliance upon the political process to resolve 
most separation of powers disputes recognizes that an effective government 
requires a degree of interbranch comity that is inconsistent with frequent 
resort to the judicial process. Despite the importance of "uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open" debate on public issues, 118 our system rests upon unex-
pressed understandings and an uncodified but shared sense of limits. 119 
Understandings are unexpressed and the sense of limits is shared but un-
codified because participants in the political process recognize the need to 
avoid open warfare and because both structural and institutional factors 
dampen the inevitable conflicts that do arise. 120 
Judicial opinions, on the other hand, raise the stakes of any particular 
conflict by clearly identifying winners and losers through formal explana-
1 
"Several statutes passed during this period exemplify Congress's efforts to reassert its 
powers. See, e.g., Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. (1988)); War 
Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-
1548 (1988)). 
115488 u.s. 361 (1989). 
116AII three of these cases were argued in the Supreme Court by Alan Morrison, director 
of litigation at Public Citizen, Inc., a public interest organization founded by Ralph Nader 
that favors more vigorous government regulation. B. CRAIG, CHADHA 61-65 (1988); Elliott, 
Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v. Synar, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 31 7, 319 n.l2 ( 198 7). 
'"For example, a conservative journalist warned that admirers of Ronald Reagan who 
advocate a strong presidency as a bulwark against intrusive actions by an unsympathetic 
Congress should consider the implications of giving similar powers to a liberal chief executive 
when political fashions change. Francis, Imperial Conservatives?, NAT'L REV., Aug. 4, 1989, 
at 37. 
'"New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
"
9See, e.g., DREW, supra note 85, at 9; Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. 
L. REV. 371, 391 (1976). This is a lesson that some notably unsuccessful recent Presidents, 
especially Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, failed to learn. POLSBY, supra note 99, at 45, 
49-50, 66. 
120See POLSBY, supra note 99, at 206-09. 
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tions that presumably will control other analytically related disputes. 121 The 
prospect oflitigation creates incentives to assert maximum positions for short-
term advantage in court and to characterize opposing views as illegiti-
mate.122 In situations where the Constitution provides no determinative an-
swer, Congress and the President would do better to seek to resolve their 
separation of powers disputes by negotiating them in good faith than to 
depend upon the judiciary as other than a last resort. Negotiated resolutions 
of specific disagreements can decide smaller questions in ways that create a 
foundation for similarly informal arrangements of future interbranch dif-
ferences while recognizing the contrasting interests of the governmental 
institutions involved. 123 
Some might object to this approach on the ground that it will undermine 
the rule of law by facilitating interbranch power grabs. Yet our political 
history teaches that "an excessive force in one direction is apt to produce a 
corresponding counterforce." 124 This is the lesson not only of the contro-
versies over the Tenure of Office Act and of Watergate, but also of most 
of our political history. Overreaching by one of the political branches typi-
cally begets reassertion by the other. 125 To be sure, the relative powers of 
Congress and the President would change over time if interbranch disputes 
were generally negotiated rather than litigated, 126 but the relative powers 
of the political branches have changed dramatically anyway. 
Consider the legislative veto and the role of the Comptroller General in 
implementing Gramm-Rudman-Hollings under the approach advocated 
here. As to the former, the legislative veto often was the price that Presi-
121 R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 18-22 (1989). Professor Nagel probably would 
not agree with the suggestion that separation of powers disputes are generally better handled 
outside the judicial system. See Nagel, A Comment on the Rule of Law Model of Separation of 
Powers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 355, 360-62 (1989) (criticizing functionalist arguments 
supporting the result in Morrison); but see id. at 363-64 (warning against the dangers of 
"[ d]octrinaire enforcement of the theory of separation of powers"). 
122 NAGEL, supra note 121, at 21; Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government 
of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 464-
65,492, 501-14 (1987). 
"' The procedural details for accomplishing interbranch negotiations are beyond the 
scope of this article. For a suggested framework for handling executive privilege disputes, 
see Shane, supra note 122, at 516-40. 
'"Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term-Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L 
REV.l3,20(1974). 
125Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 519, 532 (1987); Karl, Executive Reorgani-
zation and Presidential Power, 1977 Sur. CT. REV. 1, 34; Pierce, Political Accountability and 
Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 391, 405-06 (1987). 
Indeed, the reassertion itself may represent an alternative form of overreaching in the 
absence of the necessary interbranch comity. For example, Congress became enamored of 
the legislative veto as a means for controlling substantive administrative rules during the 
Nixon administration, when the relationship between the legislative and executive branches 
was especially bitter. Approximately eighty percent of the more than two hundred bills 
containing legislative vetoes enacted between 1950 and 1976 were approved from 1970 
onward. PoLSBY, supra note 99, at 237 n.l22 (citing Cooper & Hurley, The Legislative Veto: 
A Policy Analysis, 10 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 1 (1983)). 
126See NAGEL, supra note 121, at 22. 
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dents paid for obtaining broad delegations to undertake important initia-
tives for which a statutory basis did not already exist. Congress, protective 
of its institutional prerogatives even when it sympathized with presidential 
goals, often inserted legislative veto provisions into bills that gave the ex-
ecutive branch the requested substantive authority.I27 Because the text of 
the Constitution does not specify that a legislative veto is subject to the 
bicameralism and presentation requirements, 128 courts generally would up-
hold such accommodations. 129 In the event of disagreement between Con-
gress and the President, the political branches would have to determine the 
stakes for themselves. Congress could refuse to give the executive authority 
to act without a legislative veto, the President could disapprove a bill con-
taining such a veto, or the chief executive might accept some (but not all) 
legislative veto provisions. Resolution of these differences might vary de-
pending upon the centrality of the substantive initiative to the political pro-
gram of the President and members of Congress or upon the form of the 
particular legislative veto at issue (two-house, one-house, or committee). 
As to the latter, the procedure for removing the Comptroller General 
received almost no attention during the debate over Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings.130 That procedure was, however, the subject of intense inter-
branch contention when the position was created shortly after World War 
I. President Wilson vetoed an important bill that was designed to reform 
the federal budget because he regarded a provision authorizing the removal 
127See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968-74 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); FISHER, supra 
note 42, at 164-70; Fisher, Congress and the President in the Administrative Process: The Uneasy 
Alliance, in THE ILLUSION OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 21, 26-28 (H. Hecla & L. Salamon 
eds. 1981); Karl, supra note 125, at 3-7; Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative 
Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1064, 
1088-89 & n.74 (1981). See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. FOR THE SUBCOMM. 
ON RULES OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., STUDIES ON THE LEGIS-
LATIVE VETO (Comm. Print 1980). 
'"Chadha, 462 U.S. at 981-82 (White, J ., dissenting). 
"'Courts would still invalidate particular legislative veto provisions that allowed Congress 
to make typically judicial decisions when legislative procedures did not afford due process to 
the targets ofsuch decisions. Some have suggested that the statute at issue in Chadha had 
this infirmity. See, e.g., id. at 964-65 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). This approach 
to Chadha is not free from difficulty, however. Before the procedure at issue in that case was 
adopted, the legislative branch resolved deportation disputes through private bills. !d. at 954. 
Moreover, Congress has express power to regulate immigration. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
4. Finally, one of Madison's statements in the Constitutional Convention strongly implies his 
belief that the legislature had power over individual naturalization cases. 2 THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 236 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937) (opposing a 
proposal to require Senators to have been citizens for at least 14 years "because it will put 
it out of the power of the Nat[iona]l Legislature even by special acts of naturalization to 
confer the full rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers"). 
'"President Reagan emphasized the removal question in his signing statement. Statement 
on Signing the Bill Increasing the Public Debt Limit and Enacting the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985, PuB. PAPERS 1471, 1471-72 (1985). No mention of that subject 
occurred in the congressional debates. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 783 (1986) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). That omission might have been deliberate. See supra note 73 and ac-
companying text. 
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of the Comptroller by concurrent resolution as an incursion upon executive 
prerogatives; Congress and his successor, President Harding, negotiated a 
compromise providing for removal by joint resolution. 131 In light of the 
silence of the Constitution on the removal issue and the limited empirical 
significance of the power to remove federal officers, 132 the judiciary should 
respect this not necessarily ideal interbranch accommodation. 133 
A more fundamental objection to the role of the Comptroller arises from 
the process for appointing that official, a subject about which the Consti-
tution is quite explicit but which has been almost completely ignored in 
litigation. 134 The President is required to select the Comptroller from a list 
of three nominees provided by the congressional leadership. 135 Because the 
appointments clause does not give Congress authority to nominate officers 
or inferior officers, the procedure for choosing the Comptroller might well 
contravene the express terms of the Constitution. 136 Under the approach 
131 See Entin, supra note 15, at 754-55. 
132 See id. at 712-14, 777-81. 
13
' • CJ United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-95 n.8 (197 4) (finding no constitutional 
infirmity in requirement that congressional leaders consent to removal of Watergate special 
prosecutor even though that official exercised executive power). 
Congress and the President recently reached a negotiated resolution of another contro-
versy involving the role of the Comptroller General. Under the Competition in Contracting 
Act, 31 U .S.C. § § 3551-3556 (1988), the Comptroller was authorized temporarily to stay the 
award or implementation of government contracts that were subject to protests by disap-
pointed bidders. The Comptroller cciuld investigate such protests but his disposition could 
not bind the executive branch. Litigation over the constitutionality of the Act was ended 
when Congress amended the statute to eliminate the provision that the executive branch 
found most objectionable. Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 
875 (3d Cir.), on reh'g, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988); see 
Miller, supra note 10, at 418-21. · 
The history of Ameron could be taken to suggest that Congress and the President would 
not have reached their accommodation without the uncertainty engendered by the pendency 
of the lawsuit about the constitutionality of the Competition in Contracting Act. That is not 
the only plausible interpretation of this episode, however. Ameron arose after the executive 
branch refused to enforce the Act, thereby precipitating a test case. The political branches 
at all times regarded the dispute as a purely legal question. If a greater degree of interbranch 
comity existed, the dispute never might have arisen or could have been treated as a subject 
for genuine negotiation. I d. at 420; see supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. 
"·'The procedure for appointing the Comptroller was mentioned in passing but given no 
substantive weight in Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727-28 & n.6. 
13531 U.S.C. § 703(a)(2) (1988). 
136See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126-35 (1976) (per curiam). The only legislative role 
in the appointment process is the provision for Senate confirmation of officers of the United 
States. U.S. CaNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Congress may, of course, create positions and define 
their terms and conditions, including the qualifications of federal officials. See, e.g., 15 U .S.C. 
§ 41 (1988) (limiting partisan composition of Federal Trade Commission); 29 U .S.C. § 661 (a) 
(1988) (requiring members of Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission to be 
selected "from among persons who by reason of training, education, or experience are 
qualified"); 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(A) (1988) (disqualifying from membership on Federal 
Communications Commission persons holding financial interests in entities subject to FCC 
regulation). Such generic requirements do not significantly restrict the universe from which 
the President may nominate. The procedure for selecting the Comptroller General, on the 
other hand, allows the congressional leadership to limit the universe of potential comptrollers 
to three persons. 
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advocated in this article, the judiciary would focus upon how the Comp-
troller is hired rather than how he might be fired when assessing the validity 
of legislation conferring authority upon that official. 
To be sure, this approach would leave a residue of ambiguity about the 
precise limits oflegislative and executive power. That residue exists anyway, 
because the Supreme Court has failed to articulate a consistent methodology 
in this field. Under the alternative proposed here, Congress and the Presi-
dent would fulfill their obligation independently to interpret the Constitu-
tion.137 Sometimes this process would result in deadlock, but the prospects 
for reasonable accommodation might be enhanced if the political branches 
knew that the judiciary would not. ordinarily rescue them from the conse-
quences of their disagreements and that the outcome of one dispute would 
not bind either side in subsequent conflicts. 
IV. BRINGING POLITICAL JUDGMENT BACK IN: 
THE NEED FOR WISDOM 
Forbearing to litigate separation of powers disputes between Congress 
and the President offers one final benefit. Because participants in such dis-
putes would have less incentive to jockey for advantage in judicial proceed-
ings, they might devote more attention to the wisdom of controversial 
proposals. Courts determine only the constitutionality, not the soundness, 
of a statute or practice. J3B Professor Nathanson reminded us that "the de-
bate over ... desirability ... need not be conducted entirely on the consti-
tutional level, and that a Supreme Court decision rejecting a constitutional 
challenge should not be interpreted as a vindication of ... practical value 
.... "
139 This reminder has particular relevance to the policy innovations 
that gave rise to the recent separation of powers jurisprudence. Some of 
those innovations, whatever their constitutionality, were of dubious wisdom. 
That mundane point was frequently overlooked in the loftier legal and ac-
ademic debate over Chadha, Bowsher, Monison, and other Supreme Court 
cases. 
Consider the legislative veto. That device quite properly has been criti-
""Institutional differences between the political branches and the courts might make the 
quality of legislative-executive constitutional debate disappointing to aficionados of judicial 
interpretation. See, e.g., Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisiomnaker and Its Power to Counter 
judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 98-l 0! (1986); Mikva, How Well Does Congress Suppo,-t 
and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 587 (1983). 
""See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,712 (1986); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 
U.S. 483,488 (!955); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,447-48 (1934). 
"'"Nathanson, supra note 127, at l 091. Professor Nathanson made this point in a discussion 
of the legislative veto, but his suggestion apparently was too subtle for some readers who 
characterized his reluctance to invalidate the veto as showing his "generally favorable" dis-
position toward its desirability. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 976 n.l2 (1983) (White, J., 
dissenting); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 
VA. L. REV. 253, 255 n.5 (1982). 
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cized for skewing the administrative process in subtle but potentially im-
portant ways. In particular, the legislative veto tends to bias the process 
against regulation by giving members of Congress the opportunity to reject 
a specific proposal without having to weigh alternatives, to confer advan-
tages upon economically powerful trade and industry groups which have 
the resources to oppose regulations both at the agency and on Capitol Hill, 
to encourage broad delegations, and to increase the risk of political impasse 
between regulators and legislators. 140 Whatever the constitutionality of the 
veto, these characteristics provide potentially powerful arguments against 
the desirability of the device as a means of controlling administrative dis-
cretion. Those arguments do not depend upon hypothetical comparisons 
with other congressional mechanisms for preventing agency overreaching; 
they address the wisdom of the legislative veto on its own terms. 141 More-
over, if the legislative veto were applied as broadly as many of its enthusiasts 
proposed, Congress could quickly find itself overwhelmed by the task of 
reviewing agency regulations. 142 Even if it is constitutional, then, the legis-
lative veto is a bad idea that would create more problems than it would 
solve. 
Similarly, the abstract debate over the Comptroller General's alleged sub-
servience to Congress diverted attention from the fundamental flaws of 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings as a means for reducing the budget deficit. At 
the most basic level, the statute rests upon controversial economic assump-
140See, e.g., Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221-
22 (1984); Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of 
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1381-82, 1409-20 (1977); Martin, supra note 139, 
at 267-85. 
141 The principal empirical study of the operation and effect of the legislative veto suggested 
that the deleterious effects of the veto were greater than were those associated with other 
forms of congressional oversight of the administrative process. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 
140, at 1420-23. That study unfortunately failed to examine programs in which regulations 
were not subject to legislative vetoes. It examined only the five programs which had provided 
"[m]ost of the current federal experience with legislative veto of rulemaking." !d. at 1371. 
The omission of any program in which substantive rules were not subject to legislative veto 
prevents reliable inferences about the distinctive impact of the veto upon the programs that 
were studied. See, e.g., D. CAMPBELL &j. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL 
DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 6-7 (1963). The inability to compare the consequences of the veto 
with those of other forms of congressional oversight does not preclude an assessment of the 
impact of the veto on its own terms, ho-wever. 
'·
12This daunting prospect played an important role in the defeat of bills that would have 
created so-called generic legislative vetoes in the years before the Chadha decision. CRAIG, 
supra note 116, at 49-50, 56-57. 
At the same time, neither the Supreme Court's invalidation of the legislative veto in Chadha 
nor the general undesirability of the device has prevented its reappearance in a large number 
of statutes since 1983. Congress has enacted more than one hundred such provisions despite 
the seemingly unambiguous judicial condemnation of the practice. Almost all of these new 
vetoes appear in appropriations bills and give the power to disapprove proposed expenditures 
to committees or even to subcommittees. Despite presidential objections, the executive branch 
has acquiesced in these arrangements because they afford useful flexibility. L. FISHER, THE 
POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 102-03 (2d ed. 1987); Strauss, supra note 108, at 447 n.63. 
53 43 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 31 
tions concerning the adverse effects of deficits. HJ Even accepting the un-
derlying premise that current budgetary shortfalls have reached unacceptable 
levels, however, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings had numerous defects. First, it 
contained no sanction if the federal government exceeded the annual deficit 
limit; the statutory targets applied only to the projected deficit at the begin-
ning of the fiscal year, not to the actual deficit at the end of the fiscal year. 1•1·1 
More significant, nothing in the law required that the projected deficit be 
based upon realistic economic assumptions or that the political branches 
avoid the most blatant accounting gimmicks to keep from triggering the 
sequestration process. Consequently, the measures taken to reduce the pro-
jected deficit frequently have strained credulity. 145 These were the real 
problems presented by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. The role of the Comp-
troller General was peripheral. 
Finally, the litigation over the constitutionality of the independent coun-
sel obscured other troublesome questions about the Ethics in Government 
Act. First, by requiring an outside investigation of credible allegations of 
criminal wrongdoing against high-level executive officials, the statute pre-
sumes that the professional staff of the Department of Justice is incapable 
of dispassionately handling sensitive cases. To be sure, the Department per-
formed inadequately during Watergate. HG Ironically, the Ethics Act, which 
was passed to restore public confidence in government, subtly undermines 
that goal by resting the independent counsel provision upon a presumption 
of governmental incompetence. Perhaps this unintended consequence does 
not outweigh the benefits of avoiding perceived conflicts of interest, but 
,_, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings rests upon the notion that deficits are unmitigated evils. 
Many economists, however, reject this concept and believe that a single-minded campaign 
to reduce the deficit can do more harm than good. See, e.g., EISNER, supra note 110, at 161-
64; Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. 
REV. 593, 638-39 (1988). 
,.,.,Kuttner, The Fttdge Factor, NEW REPUBLIC, June 19, 1989, at 22, 23. Moreover, both 
the original version of the statute and the 1987 revisions passed in response to the ruling in 
Bowsher specifically limited the size of any automatic spending reductions for the fiscal year 
during which those measures were enacted. Consequently, the deficit target for those years 
was not attained. Stith, supra note 143, at 629-30. 
'"Among the devices which have been used to bring projected deficits into compliance 
with Gramm-Rudman-Hollings are postponing payments from the last day of one fiscal year 
to the first clay of the following one, assuming higher rates of economic growth and lower 
rates of inflation than predicted by reputable private forecasters, selling off government 
assets, and removing items likely to contribute substantially to the deficit (such as the savings-
and-loan relief program) "off budget" in whole or part. B. FRIEDMAN, DAY OF RECKONING 
278-79 (1988); Domenici, The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Process: An Act in Legislative 
Futility?, 25 l-lARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 540 (1988); Downey, The Futility of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, 25 l-lARV. j. ON LEGIS. 545, 548-49 (1988); Drew, Letter from Washington, NEW 
YORKER, May 15, 1989, at 87, 91; Friedman, A Deficit of Civic Courage, N.Y. REv. BoOKS, 
June l, 1989, at 23, 26; Kuttner, supra note 144, at 22-23. 
'"But seeS. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE 335-36 (1990) (contending that Justice 
Department lawyers performed creditably and had uncovered the essential facts before the 
appointment of Archibald Cox as special prosecutor). 
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that question apparently was lost in the constitutional rhetoric. 147 Second, 
despite its name, the Ethics Act emphasizes criminality rather than ethical 
impropriety. Accordingly, targets of investigations by independent counsel 
routinely proclaim themselves vindicated if the counsel does not seek an 
indictment. 148 Surely we should expect public officials to aspire to higher 
standards of conduct than "Never Been Indicted." 149 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Constitution is more than "what the judges say it is." 150 That docu-
ment provides the framework for our government and our politics. It is, in 
short, an important part of our culture as well as of our law. 151 Accordingly, 
the Constitution derives its meaning not only from judicial interpretation 
but also from shared understandings that emerge from governance and pol-
itics. This fact suggests that not every dispute over the appropriate division 
of authority between Congress and the President requires judicial resolu-
tion. Instead, the political branches themselves have resources and obliga-
tions to develop their own views and to fashion accommodations of their 
sometimes conflicting interests. Moreover, just as the Constitution might 
not apply in a determinative way to particular interbranch disputes, some-
times the wisdom of a proposed statute or policy is more important than its 
constitutionality. Both politicians and citizens too often forget this mundane 
point. 
This view of the separation of powers assumes a minimum level of inter-
branch comity. The present political situation affords few grounds for op-
timism. For most of the past generation, we have had a divided federal 
government, with one party controlling the legislative branch and the other 
controlling the executive. In addition, sophisticated legal staffs seek vigi-
'"The independent counsel statute might be seen as the only way to prevent a recurrence 
of the so-called Saturday Night Massacre, in which Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox was 
dismissed for too vigorously pressing his investigation into the Watergate affair. Jd. at 581-
82. The real lesson of that episode, however, is not what happened to Mr. Cox, but rather 
what happened to President Nixon. The national uproar that followed the Saturd<\)' Night 
Massacre not only forced Mr. Nixon to acquiesce in the appointment of a new special pros-
ecutor but also fueled widespread suspicion that he had something to hide, a suspicion that 
fatally undermined his efforts to remain in office. DREW, supra note 85, at 112-13, 115-16, 
148- 49; KUTLER, supra note 146, at406, 410-14, 619. 
""Carter, supra note 50, at 139. Not only the targets of such investigations adopt this 
rhetorical posture; Presidents do, too. See The President's News Conference, 24 WEEKLY 
CaMP. PRES. Docs. 255, 258 (1988) ("no attention is paid to the fact of how many [targets 
of independent counsel investigations], when it actually carne to trial, [were] found to be 
totally innocent"). 
"
9C. TRJLLIN, The Motto-Maker's Art, in IF You CAN'T SAY SOMETHING NICE II, 11-12, 
14 (1987). See also Carter, supra note 50, at 139. 
"°FISHER, supra note 84, at 245 (quoting ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS 
HUGHES 139 (1908)). 
'"SeeM. KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF 38I-400 (I 986); S. LEVINSON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9-53 (1988). 
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lantly to safeguard each branch's constitutional prerogatives. 152 For these 
and other reasons, pmverful incentives exist for conflict rather than coop-
eration. 
Regardless of the current outlook, however, the approach suggested here 
comports with the constitutional design for a government characterized by 
both liberty and efficiency. The unlikelihood that this approach will be 
adopted simply proves that the Constitution affords the necessary, but not 
sufficient, conditions for such a government. 153 
'"See Miller, supra note 10, at 412-26. 
'"'See D. MOYNIHAN, The "New Science of Politics" and the Old Art of Governing, in CAME THE 
REVOLUTION 301, 307 (1988); Tuus, supra note 4 J, at 42. 
